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LAW-MAKING FOR INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOWS
ROLAND STEVENS HOMET, JR.*
PREFACE
Senior executives of major United States computer and semicon-
ductor firms met recently in Florida.1 They were there to explore the
possibility of pooling their research and development budgets into a
high-technology collective, as an imitative counterthrust to the trade
practices of the Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry. William
Norris, organizer of the meeting and chairman of Control Data Corpo-
ration, recognized that such an arrangement would have to surmount
the hurdles of United States antitrust law;2 but in his view such action
was necessary because the Japanese practices had caused "massive dis-
tortion of the world competitive scene which can only be dealt with by
extraordinary action."8
Taking at full value the evident merits of this complaint, it is
worth noticing that they concern essentially just two parties: producers
of electronic equipment in Japan, and producers of similar equipment
in the United States. If-fairly or unfairly--Japanese equipment were
to take over the American market, consumers and users of such equip-
ment would not be fundamentally disadvantaged. Where there is un-
fairness, moreover, the producing industries in each country have
ready access to their governments for complaint and defense. That is
why Japanese-United States trade negotiations have been at the top of
each country's agenda for some years. And the laws to which the two
parties may have recourse are well-identified: industrial-organization
(including antitrust) and trade laws nationally, and the General Agree-
* Principal, Communications Law and Policy Counseling, Washington, D.C.; A.B.,
Harvard College, 1954; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1961. Director, International Com-
munications Policy, International Communication Agency (USICA) 1978 to 1981; Direc-
tor, Aspen Institute Program on Communications and Society 1976 to 1978. Member of
the Washington, D.C. Bar. Author, Politics, Cultures, and Communication (Praeger,
1979).
1. Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1982, at 6, col. 2. "Sixteen major U.S. electronics companies,
apparently convinced they have less to fear from one another than from their Japanese
competitors, are exploring a joint research and development venture of unprecedented
size and breadth." Id.
2. Id. Subsequently the joint research venture, Microelectronic and Computer Tech-
nology Corp. (MCC) was granted a limited antitrust clearance by the Department of
Justice.
3. Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1982, at 6 col. 2.
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ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) internationally.
These threatening vexations of trade distortion, therefore, even
when they become "extraordinary," at least take place within a clearly
understood legal and policy context. Such is not the case for the
equally threatening and potentially just as vexatious regulatory curtail-
ments to international information flow.
THE PROBLEM
Let us suppose a state of regulatory or tariff curtailment such that
European-source banking information could reach New York only by
mail or by personal travel, and further that this constraint did not ap-
ply to information movements within Europe. We would quickly dis-
cover how much of modern banking is information flow. Chase Man-
hattan Bank-a multinational corporation whose worldwide operations
are critically dependent on the rapid, reliable and inexpensive move-
ment of large volumes of information-would be immediately affected
by the curtailment. Its European competitors, such as Hambros or
Barclay's, could react instantly to banking opportunities in Europe
while Chase (New York) could not. How would Chase redispose its
headquarters? With what loss of operational grasp? And suppose fur-
ther that like barriers to financial data movement were to spread-to
Canada, Japan, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Could
Chase or any other bank remain a multinational corporation? What
would be the cost of adjustment, not just in terms of money, but in
terms of management? Would we not then have a truly "massive dis-
tortion of the world competitive scene which can only be dealt with by
extraordinary action"?
This quotation suggests the similarity between the electronic-
equipment and information-flow cases. It stems from the potentially
calamitous effects of internationalizing the currently sporadic and
piecemeal regulatory" restrictions on information flow. The threat may
not appear as urgent, or vexatious, as the one that drew the electronic
equipment producers to Florida. But, it is unmistakably present. It is
also larger and broader in its implications, and under current condi-
tions it is far less manageable. This becomes clear when one considers
the dimensions of the difference between the two cases.
To begin with, the industry ramifactions in the information-flow
case are multidimensional; they extend well beyond banks. Control
Data and other United States-based information processing firms
would have to give up international operations. The Society for World-
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wide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)4 would have
to be abandoned. United States international airlines could not com-
pete for ticket sales in Rome or Rawalpindi. International oil opera-
tions would be disrupted. American manufacturing, sales, services and
other information-dependent industries would all be adversely af-
fected. Methods of adjustment could be found, but at what costs and
with what effects on long-established patterns of business conduct?
Everywhere the national and regional firms would gain precedence,
not because of increased efficiency or improved customer relations, but
because of political fiat. It would be as if the most radical architects of
the New International Economic Order had suddenly been handed an
open season to write their prescriptions into practice-all by the sim-
ple expedient of manipulating information transactions.
Such an occasion would surely unify all affected United States in-
dustries and propel them into action. That should be a source of con-
siderable group strength, if it happened in time. But the group would
have to confront not just one nation, like Japan; it would have to deal
with a wide number of governments and intergovernmental bodies that
are engaged in the regulation of data flows. Today there are the Cana-
dian Banking Act, the French data tax and valuation proposals, Brazil-
ian and Japanese restrictions on external processing circuits, and Ger-
man requirements of in-country processing. The list is growing in
length and variety. Regulatory claims have been further staked out by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD),6 the Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics (IBI)6 and the
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations. There is signifi-
cant potential for this trend to spread-to the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), to the United
Nations Committee on Information (UNCI), to the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and to others.
All of these measures, present and prospective, are steps beyond
4. Nacumuli, SWIFT: Objectives, Standardization, Availability, Auditability, Secur-
ity, Privacy and Liability, 3 Transnat'l Data Rep. 1 (No. 6, 1980). SWIFT is the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Tele-Communications, formed in 1973 to develop
and operate an international communication network to serve the worldwide banking
community. Id. at 7.
5. The OECD was established in September 1961, by the Convention on the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development. It is the successor body to the Or-
ganization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). The OECD's aim is to promote
economic and social welfare by assisting its member governments in the formulation and
coordination of policies designed to this end. See Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), 19 Y.B. INT'L ORG. C3023 (1981).
6. The IBI was established December 1974, in Paris, by a United Nations General
Assembly resolution.
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the protection of personal privacy. That original impulse has largely
played itself out, and although there remain particular sticking points,
the international community has managed fairly well to contain the
privacy issue. What has happened beyond that is a discovery that data
flows impinge not just on privacy and other individual liberties but on
larger concerns of a political, economic, social and cultural nature. At
stake in the perception of many other governments is the permeability
or integrity of their own separate societies-something awkwardly
summed up in the phrase "information sovereignty." This is the amor-
phous policy challenge that today poses the broadest and gravest
threat to the operations of United States information-intensive mul-
tinational enterprises. By its very nature, the claim of information sov-
ereignty cannot yield to the application or elaboration of any single set
of countermeasures.
Here is another major distinction from the trade-practice com-
plaint. Privacy protection is reasonably well-understood and can be
dealt with. The same may be said of trade promotion and restriction.
There is a shared Western tradition of safeguarding individual liber-
ties; there is the GATT. Information sovereignty, however, is an im-
pulse, not a tradition; an aspiration, not a code.
Perhaps the greatest danger lies in the absence of any body of law
to which to refer or by which to contain this aspiration. On the one
hand, articulation of broadly acceptable legal principles could become
a means of legitimizing what are now still isolated incidents of national
restriction. That is what was attempted with press censorship in the
1974-78 Mass Media Declaration at UNESCO.8 On the other hand,
with no GATT-like instruments of restraint, the spreading pattern of
national regulations could harden into customary international law
with equally restrictive effect.
RESPONSES
Whatever United States preferences in the matter might be, there
are already serious efforts underway in international bodies to develop
legal principles for information flow.
The OECD has authorized two inquiries, one economic and one
legal, into the practice of moving business information across national
7. For an elaboration of this concept, see the appendix.
8. Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass
Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of
Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War;




frontiers.9 The purpose of the legal study is to determine what gaps
should be filled by public international law-perhaps in the form of an
OECD-sponsored code of conduct.
The IBI, whose stated purpose is to promote research, education
and utilization of informatics at the government level,1" has tabled a
set of ten legal principles, which the United States government (a non-
member) has labeled "premature." The IBI has a major heads-of-state
conference scheduled in Havana in 1984, and the legal report is aimed
for that conference.
The United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations has is-
sued a lengthy report describing the international regime for data flows
as a "legal vacuum." While the author of that report has disclaimed
any present intention of developing a legal regime, he concedes that
the political dynamics are not in his control.1"
With all this activity going on, and more quite probably in the
offing, the question for United States policy and preparations is not
whether it should be taking place but how to influence it in a construc-
tive direction.
There is considerable confusion and a dissipation of effort at pre-
sent in determining what body of law to appeal to. There are elements
of trade, taxation, commerce, telecommunications, human rights and
state sovereignty to consider. None of these areas alone can span the
field. Perhaps it would be useful to retreat to the generic spawning
ground of "information sovereignty," and then to split the response
into separate elements of private and public ordering.
The first question to address would be how far private order-
ing-the systems of law that govern business relations among private
parties-can contribute to a reduction of "information sovereignty"
tensions. One would wish to look here at commercial laws, insurance
arrangements, enlightened business practices and other such matters
to determine what elaborations (or simple publicizing) may be in the
common interest.
Second, one would examine the prospects for improved harmoni-
zation of commercial laws and practices, and/or agreement on applica-
9. See PRELIMINARY INTERPRETATION OF OECD/BIAC SURVEY, DSTI/ICCP/83.19
(May 17, 1983); LLInry IssuEs RxLATED To TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS, DSTI/ICCP/
83.16 (May 31, 1983). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OFFICE OF INVESTMENT AF-
FAIRS, CURRENT STATUS REPORT: SELECTED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ACTivTEs RE-
LATING TO TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES 34 (August, 1983).
10. Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics (IBI), 19 Y.B. INT'L ORG. C1645g
(1981).
11. See K. SAuvANT, TRANSNATIONAL CoRPoa.Amos AND TRANSBORDEE DATA FLows: A
TECHNICAL PAPER (1982).
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ble private international law (choice of laws). Might the Uniform Com-
mercial Code provide something of a model for international
information transactions, perhaps through the good offices of a
UNIDROIT? 12
Third, one would consider what, if anything, remains that requires
resolution under public international law-the law that operates
among nation states. It may develop that trade and taxation, telecom-
munications and intellectual property need more attentive application
of their respective international charters and nothing more. On the
other hand, some new charter may be called for. Here one would want
to weigh very carefully all the factors that impinge on regularity of
business transactions, such as choice of forum, displacement of existing
laws, and pace of introduction.
Fourth, one would address the form of any new legal re-
gime-code, convention, declaration, or anything else-with equal at-
tention to effects on international commercial transactions.
Fifth and finally, although in some respects it might be taken up
first, one would have to develop a scrupulously analyzed and re-ana-
lyzed timing sequence from the first announcement of the inquiry
through the warding off of premature regulatory initiatives to the final
introduction of specific and seasoned proposals for action. Plainly, this
would have to be done in the United States in close consultation with
all affected segments of the United States information industries as
well as with the Department of State.
As this last point demonstrates, an effective plan for countering
"information sovereignty" would need to combine research and strat-
egy, study and action. That is my submission.
FORECAST
Nothing of this nature or dimension is currently in prospect. The
State Department does not wish to get drawn into any exploration of
legal regimes for fear of counterproposals. United States multinational
corporations accept that judgment because they perceive no imminent
crisis.
Does it matter if they are wrong? If believe so. I suspect that the
vector of political forces now at work in the world is pointing in the
direction of an International Law of Information Conference and an
12. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) was
established in April 1926, by an agreement between the Italian Government and the
League of Nations. The aim of the organization is to study and propose methods to
harmonize private law between states or groups of states. See International Institute for
the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), 19 Y.B. Iwr'L ORG. C2136g (1981).
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OPEC-like cartelization of spectrum, both within ten years. Each of
these prospects holds the potential for vast and disastrous impact. We
could avoid them but we are not doing so. That cannot last. Unless we
in the United States exert ourselves to redirect the swirl of "sover-
eignty" forces along more constructive paths, we face a potentially ca-
lamitous disintegration of information resources and relationships that
will benefit neither United States interests nor the international com-
munity. The time for strategic thinking is now.
APPENDIX
TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND THE CLAIMS OF
OFFENDED SOVEREIGNTY*
Computer communications across national boundaries can be re-
stricted in a number of ways, of which overt data regulation is only one
and-as the recent OECD experience suggests-perhaps the one that is
the most amenable to adjustment. Other available instruments of con-
trol include refusal of private lines, imposition of usage- or distance-
sensitive pricing, and assertion of local-carrier monopolies over the
terms of service. Whatever the method chosen, the motivations are
likely to constitute a complex mixture of impulses and concerns.
Those that relate to protection of personal privacy touch on widely
shared values and accordingly lend themselves to at least some mea-
sure of harmonization. Those that can be attributed to strict economic
rivalry-the desire to protect and encourage home-grown as opposed to
foreign industries-can (at least in theory) be drawn to account in the
framework of the GATT. But there are other motivations, loosely
bound up in the preservation of "sovereignty," that escape such easy
classification. It is desirable, if possible, to reduce them to their con-
stituent parts for analysis and appreciation.
The French have probably been the most vocal on the subject of
sovereignty. At a September 1977 Vienna, Austria symposium organ-
ized by the OECD, Louis Joinet of the French Justice Ministry pro-
claimed that: "Information is an instrument of power, of policies, of
culture."' The following year at the SPIN Conference organized by
UNESCO and the Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics, the
French delegation proposed a resolution that passed by consensus:
Considering the threat of evasion of national laws posed
by these (international data) flows, particularly for countries
which have passed legislation on informatics and freedoms,
Considering present disequilibria in the direction of these
flows which could place certain national sovereignties in jeop-
ardy if the confidential nature of certain data relating to the
* This appendix is a verbatim reproduction of a paper delivered by the author to a
State Department task force in 1979. The task force disbanded before the paper was
discussed.
1. See generally OROANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY (1979).
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States and business enterprises as well as of information re-
garding the private lives of individuals, were not respected as a
result of such dislocalization of data,
Recommends:
3. Considering the political, economic, social, and legal
dimensions of the problem of data flows without seeking to re-
duce them in a single international instrument, to only one of
such aspects. .... I
We may ourselves look at each of the relevant aspects of national
sovereignty in turn.
1. National Security
Obviously if vital or sensitive information relating to the national
defense or national economic planning is processed abroad, a country
may feel itself excessively dependent upon data banks and communica-
tions circuits that are not within its exclusive control. Since it is gov-
ernment agencies that choose where and how to process this data, and
whether to maintain duplicate data and/or processing locally, the rem-
edy for this concern would seem to lie in the government's own hands.
A broader concern, which may have been magnified by the OPEC
oil boycott, is the general undesirability of depending for strategic re-
sources on unreliable foreign suppliers. Information is coming increas-
ingly to be recognized as a strategic resource, and the United States
holds a dominant position in the capacity for and sophistication of in-
formation processing. The Canadians have publicly voiced their con-
cern that information in United States data banks might be perempto-
rily withheld for security or other reasons, court injunctions, or a
change in United States law. A response to this apprehension should
cite not only the ideological commitment of the United States to the
free flow of information but also the competitive realities in data
processing (vis A vis Japan and others) that preclude arbitrary monop-
olistic practices.
2. Economic Sovereignty
Computer communications, whether internal or external, may
have a number of destabilizing effects on a country's economic struc-
ture and performance. They may threaten (as they have in the United
2. SPIN Conference-Intergovernmental Conference on Strategies and Policies for
Informatics, 28 Aug.-6 Sept. 1978, Torremolinos, Spain.
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States) established patterns of monopoly control over telecommunica-
tions, designed to assure reliability and accountability, which in most
countries is seen as a proper sovereign prerogative. Employment effects
of electronic automation may also cause concerns; fear of major unem-
ployment from computerization is reflected in a recent British poll.
The Nora Report in France, while painting an optimistic economic fu-
ture with "informatisation," warned of near-term increases in
unemployment.8
As indicated, such effects would occur whether data processing
were carried on internally or externally. The sovereign concern with
this aspect of trans-border data flows is associated with a loss of con-
trol-the inability to dictate the pace at which electronic processing
will be introduced, and to relate that pace to the fashioning of neces-
sary economic adjustments such as retraining and relocation of dis-
placed workers. This may be only a transitional concern, but one that
is keenly felt and that cannot be dismissed as simple economic rivalry.
In the Third World, the question of economic sovereignty is likely
to arise in a different form, as electronic data communications are
linked to the "excessive power" and "unaccountability" of the multina-
tional corporation. The MNC, it may be said, scoops up raw materials
for fabrication and sale elsewhere, and it similarly sends locally gener-
ated data out for processing and use in other quarters-all without the
supervisory control or participation of the host government. Further,
LDC governments may fasten on the international communications of
the MNC as an indispensable attribute of its economic functioning,
and seek to "squeeze" those communications as a way of bringing the
MNC to terms. So long at least as Third World countries have no stake
of their own in regional or international data communications, they are
unlikely to attach any countervailing value to freedom of information
flow. This part of the debate may therefore tend in the direction of the
Economic and Social Council and be taken up as part of the rights and
responsibilities of multinational corporations.
3. Social Sovereignty
Anyone who has had a billing dispute with a credit card company
or a health insurance firm knows the frustrations of dealing with a
computer. Others may fear that turning people into machine-readable
data entails a form of dehumanization that is damaging to society. Of
course these results can occur wherever the processing takes place, but
again trans-border data flows involve a further alienation and loss of
control.
3. S. NORA & A. MINC, THz COMPUTERIZATION OF SocIETY: A REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT OF FRANcE 33-34 (1980).
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The Nora Report speaks of a "crise de civilisation"-a conflict be-
tween traditional values and modernization.' In the long term, com-
puterization presents a choice (drawing on Brzezinski, Between Two
Eras (1970)) between an elitist and a democratic society, one con-
trolled by a few technocrats or one open to widened individual partici-
pation. This choice, by fair implication, must be subject to the control
of the affected society.
Computer communications and their broadened access to informa-
tion may, in the judgment of the Nora Report,' introduce positive eco-
nomic and social values, such as the decentralization of public adminis-
tration and the improved competitiveness of small and medium-sized
firms. But these opportunities will have to contend against the strong
French traditions of centralization, rigid administrative hierarchies,
and the domination of big business.' There is a need to avoid the se-
quence "rigidity-explosion" that is all too familiar to France. Only a
deliberate policy of social change, managed by the French government,
can in this view accommodate the conflicting forces and foster a posi-
tive evolution towards a new and more open society.
In summary, sovereign control and regulation are seen as neces-
sary to equalize matters and to prevent the alien forces symbolized (for
Nora) by IBM from precipitating France in a direction that requires
social guidance.7 Similar views may well be held, though less explicitly,
by other European countries.
4. Cultural Sovereignty
At a New York Data Regulation Conference in December, 1978,
Mr. Bernasconi of the IBI said that countries must fear falling victim
to "cultural homogenization."' The form of information storage affects
both language and knowledge, says Nora; given the present dominance
of the United States as a locus for storage, "unspoken criteria originat-
ing from the American cultural model will prevail." 9 It is blue jeans
and Coca-Cola and popular songs all over again.
But the argument is more subtle and more penetrating. To permit
Americans or anyone else to control the world's data banks is to allow
the ways of perceiving reality to be modeled by a single society. The
4. Id. at 1.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id. at 6-8.
8. See id. at 131.
9. Id. at 131.
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categories of software incorporate choices of context and connection
that reflect a particular informational and logical perspective. To be
bound to someone else's perspective on these matters is to accept a
species of "cultural alienation." 10 So says the Nora Report, adding that
the installation of data banks is for this reason an imperative of
sovereignty."
Lest this be thought extreme, the Chinese under Mao refused to
import computers because the hardware was thought to embody alien
culture."' What the French are saying, more moderately, is that the
dictionaries and grammars of the future should not all be edited in the
same country.
5. Conclusion
This has been a summary of genuine sovereign concerns that have
nothing to do with the protection of personal privacy or with straight
economic rivalry. The fact that they are genuine does not, however,
mean that they should prevail. The "free flow of information" principle
is an answer to sovereignty; it resists Balkanization no matter how well
motivated. Yet understanding the apprehensions of others about social,
economic and cultural effects of trans-border data flows may help us
consult with them about devising positive rather than restrictive reme-
dies-about building up their own data processing and communication
capabilities rather than cutting back those already in existence. For
what it is worth, the French at the 1978 UNESCO General Conference
co-sponsored a U.S. resolution (which was adopted) calling for "the
provision to developing countries of technological and other means for
promoting a free flow and a wider and better balanced exchange of
information of all kinds."' s (Emphasis added). That was in response to
claims of sovereignty.
10. Id. at 80.
11. Id.
12. Aspen Institute Conference on Communications Policy Making, Toronto, Canada,
March 1977 (comments of the national librarian, a Chinese national).
13. UNESCO REs. 4/9. 3/2, 20 UNESCO GEN. CoNF. R s., UNESCO Doc. 20C/Reso-
lutions at 100-04 (1978).
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